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Abstract: We outline a benchmark carbon dioxide (CO2) intensity system with tradable permits for the 
aviation industry that will incent in-sector emission abatement opportunities that cost less than the social 
cost of carbon (SCC). The system sets benchmark emission intensities (CO2 emissions per revenue ton 
kilometer) by route group and facilitates flexibility in meeting the benchmarks by allowing airlines to sell 
permits if they operate more efficiently than the benchmarks, and buy permits if they do not meet the 
benchmarks. The CO2 benchmark system could operate concurrently with existing measures to mitigate 
aviation CO2 emissions, will reduce the number of offsets needed to achieve carbon-neutral growth, and 
provide another (optional) lever to address fairness issues in climate regulations. Moreover, by providing 
a blueprint for other industries to price marginal emissions at the SCC, a CO2 benchmark system could 
preserve the ‘carbon budget’ for use by high-cost abatement industries such as the aviation industry.  
1 Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 
02139, USA (e-mail: niven@mit.edu).
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1. Introduction
In 2009, the International Air Transport Association set 
goals to achieve carbon neutral growth from 2020 on-
wards and to reduce emissions in 2050 by 50% relative to 
the 2005 level (IATA, 2009). As the industry growth rate 
is expected to outstrip efficiency improvements, global 
aviation emissions are projected to grow by 322% be-
tween 2006 and 2050 under optimistic technology and 
operational improvement assumptions, and by 347% un-
der moderate improvement assumptions (ICAO, 2009).
To help achieve its emission reduction goals, the 39th 
ICAO Assembly agreed to a market based measure 
known as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme 
for International Aviation (CORSIA) in 2016 (ICAO, 
2016a). For the period 2021 to 2035, the CORSIA sets 
out requirements for airlines to fund reductions in CO2 
emissions elsewhere to compensate for aviation CO2 
emissions above the 2020 level through the purchase 
of carbon offsets. The proposed formula to determine 
the number of offsets that an airline must purchase is a 
weighted average of the growth factor for that airline and 
the industry-wide growth factor. 
Although the CORSIA is a step in the right direction to 
abate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it will not result 
in an efficient level of emissions abatement from either 
the perspective of the aviation industry or society. From 
an industry point of view, the level of abatement is ef-
ficient when the cost of the last unit abated is equal to 
the price of offsets. However, as the costs of each airline’s 
emissions are partially borne by other airlines under the 
CORSIA, the agreement will not incent airlines to imple-
ment all abatement options that cost less than the price 
of offsets until 2030 at the earliest and perhaps not at all.
As is well-established in economic theory (Pigou, 1920), a 
socially efficient level of emissions abatement occurs when 
the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the marginal 
benefit of avoided damages, which is approximated by the 
social cost of carbon (SCC). This will not occur under the 
CORSIA for two reasons. First, the price of offsets, espe-
cially in the near to medium term, is likely to be much less 
than the SCC. Second, even if the price of offsets was equal 
to the SCC, as noted above, airlines will not exercise all 
abetment options that cost less than the offset price. 
In this paper, we outline a benchmark CO2 intensity sys-
tem with tradeable permits that incents a socially efficient 
level of emissions abatement from international aviation. 
The proposed system sets benchmark levels of CO2 emis-
sions per revenue ton kilometer (RTK) for aviation route 
groups. Airlines that operate below the benchmark in-
tensities are awarded permits and airlines that emit more 
CO2 per RTK than set out by the benchmark are required 
to purchase permits. Trade in permits among airlines will 
lead to a market permit price, and the stringency of the 
benchmarks are set so that permit price is equal to the 
SCC. This system can operate simultaneously with the 
CORSIA and other aviation mitigation measures.
The proposed benchmark CO2 intensity system applies the 
SCC to a fraction of each airline’s emissions rather than 
all emission. Accordingly, an aviation benchmark CO2 in-
tensity system provides a blueprint for efficient emissions 
abatement elsewhere that is more palatable to industry 
groups than other policies that apply the SCC to all emis-
sions, such a carbon tax. As aviation emission abatement 
options are expensive relative to those in other sectors 
(Winchester et al., 2013), the aviation industry has a strong 
incentive to ‘lead the way’ in imposing a socially efficient 
carbon price and ultimately preserve the Earth’s limited 
capacity to absorb GHG emissions for its own use. Other 
benefits from a benchmark CO2 intensity system include: 
(i) it provides an (optional) additional lever to address ‘fair-
ness’ concerns in assigning emission abatement obligations 
to airlines, (ii) it reduces the number of offsets required for 
the industry to achieve carbon neutral growth; and by pric-
ing emissions at the SCC it may (iii) improve the aviation 
industry’s relationship with consumers and investors, and 
(iv) prevent governments from imposing more costly poli-
cies on the aviation industry in the future.
This paper has four further sections. The next Section high-
lights incentives to reduce emissions under the CORSIA 
and outlines why this scheme will not result in an efficient 
level of emissions abatement. Section 3 discusses the moti-
vation for the aviation industry to price marginal emissions 
at the SCC. Section 4 outlines the proposed benchmark 
CO2 intensity system. The final section concludes.
2. The CORSIA and Incentives for 
Aircraft Operators to Abate CO2 
Emissions
The regulations for the CORSIA are set out in ICAO 
(2016a, pp. I80-I86). The scheme will cover international 
flights on routes in which both the origin state/country 
and the destination state are participating in the scheme 
(with exemptions for some flights). A pilot phase will op-
erate from 2021 to 2023 and the first phase will run from 
2024 to 2026. Participation in both the pilot phase and 
the first phase is voluntary.1
The second phase will operate from 2027 to 2035 with 
mandatory participation by all states and airlines that do 
1 Although both the pilot phase and the first phase are voluntary, 
they differ with respect to how emissions from aircraft operators in each 
state are determined in offset obligation calculations. In the pilot phase, 
states may either apply an aircraft operator’s emissions in a given year 
during that phase (i.e., 2021; 2022 and 2023), or the aircraft operator’s 
emissions in 2020. In the first phase, an aircraft operator’s offsetting 
requirement for a given year is based on its emissions in that year.
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not meet the exemption criteria of the CORSIA. States 
exempt from the second phase include countries that 
have an individual share of international aviation activi-
ties (measured in RTKs) in 2018 less than 0.5% of indus-
try RTKs, or whose cumulative share in the list of states 
from the highest to the lowest amount of RTKs is less 
than 90% of total industry RTKs. Least developed coun-
tries, small island developing states and landlocked de-
veloping countries are also exempt. Aviation activities in 
participating countries are exempt for (1) aircraft opera-
tors that emit less than 10,000 metric tons of CO2 from 
international aviation per year, (2) aircraft with less than 
5,700 kilograms (kg) of maximum take-off mass, and (3) 
humanitarian, medical and firefighting operations.
Emissions from aviation activities that are not covered by 
the scheme, due to voluntary participation or exemptions, 
are not required to be offset by airlines participating in the 
agreement. Each new entrant is exempt from the scheme 
for three years after it commences operations, or until the 
year that its annual emissions exceed 0.1% of total industry 
emissions in 2020, whichever occurs earlier. Offset credits 
for use in the CORSIA can, with some restrictions (see 
ICAO, 2016a, p. I-85, para. 21), be sourced from mech-
anisms established under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement.
ICAO will review the CORSIA every three years from 
2022 to evaluate the scheme’s role in the sustainable de-
velopment of the international aviation sector. Among 
other functions, this process will ‘…update the scheme’s 
design elements to improve implementation, increase 
effectiveness, and minimize market distortion’ (ICAO, 
2016a, p. I84). A special review of the CORSIA on the ter-
mination of the scheme, its extension or other improve-
ments beyond 2035 will take place by the end of 2032.   
2.1 Offset Requirements for Aircraft 
Operators 
As defined in ICAO (2016a, p. I-83), the quantity of CO2 
emissions that each airline operator i  must offset in year t  (f _(i t )  is:
  (1)
where e _(i t ) is emissions from aircraft operator i  covered 
by CORSIA in year t , G _(t ) is the emissions growth factor 
for the sector, g _(i t ) is the emissions growth factor for air-
craft operator i , λ _(t ) is the weight on the sectoral emissions 
growth factor (0 ≤  λ _(t ) ≤  1). G _(t ) and g _(i t ) are defined as:
  (2)
  (3)
where E _(t ) = ∑ _(i )e _(i t ) is total emissions covered by the 
CORSIA in year t , E _( ) is average annual total emissions 
covered by CORSIA between 2019 and 2020, and e _(i ) is 
the annual average of aircraft operator’s i  emissions cov-
ered by CORSIA between 2019 and 2020. For the pur-
pose of calculating marginal offset obligations (see Sec-
tion 2.2), it is useful to note that if emissions increase 
relative to those in 2020 (E _(t ) > E _( ) , the industry growth 
factor is between zero and one (0 < G _(t ) < 1). Similarly, 
if e _(i t ) > e _(i ), 0 < g _(i t ) < 1 .
The weights on the sectoral and individual airlines’ 
emissions growth rates vary over time according to the 
schedule for λ _(t ) displayed in Table 1. From 2021 to 2029, 
offset obligations depend only on airline emissions and 
the sectoral growth factor (λ _(t ) = 1). For other years, exact 
values of λ _(t ) are yet to be determined but upper limits 
have been set for this parameter. From 2030 to 2032, the 
weight on the sectoral emissions growth factor must be 
less than 0.8 (and the weight on each airline’s emission 
growth factor greater than 0.2), and there is a significant 
reduction in the upper limit on λ _(t ) from 2033 onward. 
As detailed below, when λ _(t ) >  0, aircraft operators face 
distorted incentives to abate emissions as the reduction 
in an airline’s emissions by one ton reduces that airline’s 
emissions offset requirement by less than one ton. 
2.2 Marginal Offset Obligations Under the 
CORSIA 
The change in an airline’s CORSIA offset obligation from 
emitting an additional ton of emissions (its marginal 
offset obligation) can be determined by differentiating 
equation (1) with respect to e _(i t ). 2 After some manipula-
tion, this yields:   (4)
where α _(i t ) =  is the share of airline’s i  emissions in in-
dustry emissions in year t  (0 < α _(i t ) ≤  1). 
2 Our analysis assumes that a change in an airline’s emissions does 
not change emissions from other airlines due to strategic competition 
or other effects.
Table 1. Weight on the sectoral emissions growth factor in 
offset obligation calculations.
Period λ t
2021 to 2029 λ _(t ) =  1
2030 to 2032 λ _(t ) ≤ 0 .8
2033 to 2035 λ _(t ) ≤  0 .3
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Noting that α _(i t ) + G _(t )(1 – α _(i t )  < 1, equation (4) shows that 
 <  1 when λ _(t ) >  0. That is, when the weight on the 
industry growth factor is greater than zero, the quantity 
of emissions an airline must offset per ton of additional 
emissions is less than one. Consequently, emissions from 
each airline impose external costs on other airlines in the 
form of additional offset requirements to achieve carbon 
neutral growth. Ultimately (when λ _(t ) >  0) this means 
that airlines will not have an inventive to implement all 
abatement options that cost less that the price of offsets.
Equation (4) also reveals that each airline’s marginal 
offset obligation will increase over time due to two fac-
tors. First, as  approaches one as G _(t ) approaches one, 
growth in annual industry emissions will increase mar-
ginal offset obligations. Second, as ∂ /∂λ _(t ) < 1, reduc-
tions in λ _(t ) in later phases of the CORSIA (see Table 1) 
will increase marginal offset obligations.
To further illustrate incentives for airlines to abate emis-
sions under the CORSIA, Figure 1 plots marginal offset 
obligations for an airline for alternative (constant) values 
of the share of an airline’s emission in industry emissions 
(α _(i t ) . These calculations assume that both airline and in-
dustry-wide emissions grow by 4% per year.  In years for 
which exact values for λ _(t ) have not been determined, we 
set λ _(t ) equal to the maximum thresholds permitted in the 
scheme (e.g., λ _(t ) = 0.8 for 2030, 2031 and 2032). 
The figure illustrates that, in the early years of the COR-
SIA, the marginal offset obligations are significantly less 
than one and that the share of an airline’s emissions in 
total emissions has a moderate impact on that airline’s 
marginal offset obligation. Through time, growth in in-
dustry emissions and decreases in λ _(t ): (1) increase mar-
ginal offset obligations, and (2) reduce the impact of each 
airline’s emissions share on marginal offset requirements. 
2.3 Incentives for Airline Operators to Abate 
Emissions
As the marginal offset obligation for an airline is less than 
one (in most cases), the CORSIA will incent less in-sec-
tor emissions abatement than is efficient from an indus-
try perspective. This is because some of the cost of each 
airline’s emissions is borne by other aircraft operators, 
so airlines will not implement all emissions abatement 
options that cost less than the offset price. Ultimately, 
the aviation industry will purchase more offsets than it 
would under a regulation that is efficient from an indus-
try perspective. The industry could address this issue by 
basing airlines offset obligations solely on each airline’s 
emissions-growth factor in the calculation of offset obli-
Figure 1. Additional airline offset requirements due to a one-unit increase in CO2 emissions for alternative airline emissions shares (α_(it) . 
Note: Airline CO2 emissions and industry CO2 emissions are assumed to grow by 4% per year. 
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gations (i.e., set λ _(t ) = 0), but this is only likely to happen 
in the later years of the scheme (if at all). 
From a societal point of view, the CORSIA is unlikely 
to result in an efficient level of abetment even if λ _(t ) = 1. 
This is because current estimates for the SCC are around 
$56/tCO2 (Smith and Braathen, 2015; Evans et al., 2017) 
and the price of Certified Emission Reductions—which 
are eligible for compliance with the CORSIA—was less 
than $0.45/tCO2 in May 2017. 
3. Motivation for an Aviation Carbon 
Price Equal to the Social Cost of 
Carbon 
Relative to the CORSIA when λ _(t ) > 0 (and the price of 
offsets is less than the SCC), a policy that incents all 
abatement options that costs less than the SCC may in-
crease or decrease costs for the aviation industry, as il-
lustrated in Figure 2.3 On one hand, the industry would 
gain by implementing additional abatement options that 
cost less than the price of offsets. On the other hand, 
executing abatement options that are more costly than 
the offset price (but less than the SCC) will impose ad-
3 As the cost of an additional ton of CO2 emissions varies across 
airlines under the CORSIA, Figure 2 represents the additional cost for 
an ‘average’ airline.
ditional costs on the industry. However, even if there are 
additional costs in some years, the aviation industry may 
experience dynamic gains from pricing emissions at the 
SCC by providing momentum for similar emission pric-
es in other sectors.
Avoiding undesirable levels of global warming by 2100 
requires meeting a ‘carbon budget’ for cumulative global 
GHG emissions out to the end of the century. As avia-
tion emission abatement options are expensive relative 
to those for other sectors, the aviation industry has an 
incentive to preserve a share of the ‘carbon budget’ for 
its own use. The aviation industry can achieve this objec-
tive by implementing a cost-effective system that incents 
abatement options that cost less than the SCC. In addi-
tion to incenting more emissions abatement than under 
current measures, such a system can provide a blueprint 
for other industries to impose a socially efficient carbon 
price. In this connection, an important feature of the 
benchmark CO2 intensity system outlined in Section 
4 is that it only imposes the SCC on a fraction of each 
airline’s emissions and is therefore likely to be more pal-
atable than other measures for pricing emissions at the 
SCC, such as a carbon tax. A benchmark CO2 intensity 
system may also prevent governments from imposing 
policies that impose a greater cost on the aviation indus-
try in the future. 
Figure 2. Costs and benefits to the aviation industry from implementing all abatement options that cost less than the sCC relative to 
costs and benefits from the CORsIA when λ _(t ) > 0.
Note: the figure represents the cost of an additional ton of emissions for an average airline under this CIORsIA. 
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A carbon price equal to the SCC on marginal aviation 
emissions may also spur deployment of climate regula-
tions by addressing ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 
1968) issues related to the carbon budget. First, results 
from the experimental economics literature show that 
first-mover choice is an important in influencing coop-
eration to obtain socially desirable outcomes (Clark and 
Sefton, 2001), and that reputation maintains contribu-
tions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level 
(Milinski et al., 2002). Second, Weitzman (2014) shows 
that that a single internationally binding minimum car-
bon price is able to resolve the global warming free-rider 
externality problem. 
The aviation industry also has an incentive to stimulate 
implementation of an efficient CO2 price sooner rather 
than later. The current absence of appropriate mitigation 
incentives means that many low-cost abatement options 
are not implemented each year. As a result, larger (and 
more costly) emission reductions will be required in later 
years to stay within the carbon budget. 
4. A Benchmark CO2 Intensity System 
for International Aviation
In this section, we outline a benchmark CO2 intensity 
system with tradeable permits as a cost-effective way for 
the aviation industry to price marginal emissions at the 
SCC. We also show that this system can operate concur-
rently with existing measures to abate aviation CO2 emis-
sions and has several other desirable attributes.
Output-based CO2 benchmarks are common in emis-
sions trading schemes (ETSs) to allocate free emission 
rights. For example, manufacturing firms in the EU ETS 
receive emissions rights based on, among other factors, 
their historical output and product-level CO2 bench-
marks (EC, 2017). In the New Zealand ETS, emission 
rights are allocated to trade-exposed, emission intensive 
firms based on CO2 benchmarks and current output 
(Smith, 2009). 
The benchmark CO2 intensity system we propose for in-
ternational aviation operates as an implicit ETS with (1) 
free allocation of emissions rights based on CO2 bench-
marks and current firm output, and (2) an endogenous 
emissions cap so that the price of emissions rights equals 
the SCC. Allocating emissions rights based on current 
output and CO2 benchmarks generates an implicit out-
put subsidy that, at the industry level, mitigates output 
price effects due to the emissions price. As such, emis-
sion reductions eventuate only by inducing changes in 
production techniques and not by reducing demand. 
Nevertheless, Mannix (2015) argues that such systems 
have substantial advantages as they are resistant to rent 
seeking and minimize the damage to the competitiveness 
of jurisdictions using them.
4.1 The Mechanics of a Benchmark CO2 
Intensity System for International 
Aviation
The key elements of a CO2 benchmark intensity system 
with tradable permits, explained in detail below, include:
1. ICAO’s sets benchmark CO2 intensities (CO2 emis-
sions per RTK) for each route group.
2. Airlines that operate more efficiently than the bench-
marks are able to sell permits and airlines with CO2 
intensities higher than the benchmarks are required 
to purchase permits. 
3. The stringency of the CO2 benchmarks is set so that 
the market price of permits is equal to the SCC.
The CO2 benchmark system relies on setting benchmark 
levels of CO2 emissions per RTK for each route group. 
To reflect differences in route characteristics (e.g., dis-
tance and cargo type) different benchmarks could be set 
for each route group, where a route-group consists of 
combinations of different characteristics selected by the 
industry. For example, a route group could be defined as 
passenger flights traveling fewer than 800 kilometers be-
tween origins and destinations in developed nations. 
Under a benchmark CO2 intensity system, the 
fleet-wide benchmark CO2 intensity for each airline 
is a RTK-weighted average of the route-groups that it 
serves. Airlines with fleet-wide CO2 emissions per RTK 
lower than their benchmarks are awarded permits, and 
airlines that operate at a felt-wide CO2 intensity above 
their benchmark are required to purchase permits. Trade 
in CO2 benchmark permits among airlines will lead to 
a market price for CO2 benchmark permits.4 This price 
will incent airlines to implement all efficiency improve-
ments that cost less than the price of permits. Airlines 
with CO2 emissions per RTK lower than their fleet-wide 
benchmark intensity will be able to sell more permits by 
improving efficiency. At the same time, airlines with CO2 
intensities that are higher than their fleet-wide bench-
mark will need to buy fewer permits by improving ef-
ficiency. 
An economic efficient outcome under the system relies 
on a market price of permits equal to the SCC, achieved 
by judiciously setting the route-group benchmarks. 
Specifically, more stringent CO2 benchmarks (lower 
benchmark emission intensities) will result in a higher 
permit price, while less stringent benchmarks (higher 
benchmark emission intensities) will lead to a lower per-
mit price. To minimize the risks of imposing large costs 
4 If the industry-wide, RTK-weighted average of the benchmark 
CO2 intensities is lower than the industry-wide CO2 intensity in ‘busi-
ness as usual’, the market price will be positive. If the opposite is true, 
the permit price will be zero.
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on the aviation industry, initial benchmark intensities 
could be set at a low level in an information-gathering/
pilot phase. In practice, the CO2 benchmarks would be 
lowered over time as new, more fuel-efficient aircraft en-
ter service.
In addition to providing a catalyst for preserving the 
carbon budget, a benchmark CO2 intensity system has 
at least three features that the aviation industry may find 
appealing. First, as permits purchased by airlines that 
operate above their CO2 benchmarks are sourced from 
other airlines, the system is revenue neutral at the indus-
try level. Second, the assignment of benchmark intensity 
allows free CO2 emissions for each airline equal to the 
amount given by each airline’s industry-wide bench-
mark multiplied by its industry-wide RTKs (i.e., it does 
not apply the SCC to all emissions). Third, by increasing 
in-sector emissions abatement, the system will decrease 
the number of offsets that the industry must purchase to 
achieve carbon neutral growth.   
To illustrate the operation of a benchmark CO2 intensity 
system, we consider an illustrative numerical example, 
summarized in Table 2. Suppose there is a single route 
group and the aviation industry consists of two opera-
tors, Airline A and Airline B.5 In the absence of a CO2 
benchmark system, each airline flies 1 million RTKs per 
year and the CO2 intensity for Airline A is 95 kgCO2/RTK 
while that for Airline B is 85 kgCO2/RTK, which results 
in an industry-wide CO2 intensity of 90 kgCO2/RTK.
Suppose that ICAO sets a benchmark CO2 intensity of 
88 kgCO2/RTK—moderately more stringent than the in-
dustry intensity. Both airlines have an incentive to abate 
emissions by improving efficiency under this regulation. 
Airline A will improve efficiency to reduce the number 
of permits that it needs to buy, and Airline B will im-
prove efficiency so that it can sell more permits. The sec-
ond panel of Table 2 lists a potential equilibrium under a 
5 An example with multiple route groups is presented in 
Section 4.3.
CO2 benchmark of 88 kgCO2 per RTK. Airline A emits 
5 kgCO2 per RTK more than allowed by the benchmark, 
so it has to purchase permits for 5 million kgCO2 from 
Airline B, which has an emissions intensity of 5 kgCO2 
per RTK below the benchmark. The market price of CO2 
permits would depend on each airline’s abatement costs 
relative to the benchmark CO2 intensity and, as noted 
above, the benchmark intensity should be set so that the 
CO2 price equals the SCC. 
The example also highlights that the industry will need to 
purchase fewer permits to achieve carbon neutral growth 
(industry-wide CO2 emissions fall from 180 million kg to 
176 million kg), and that airlines will only face the SCC 
on a fraction of their emissions (Airline A emits 93 mil-
lion kgCO2 but only has to purchase permits for 5 mil-
lion kgCO2). Airlines only pay the SCC on a fraction of 
emissions because, as noted above, the CO2 benchmark 
system is analogous to an ETS with 100% free allocation 
of emissions rights based on the benchmark CO2 inten-
sity and current output (and an endogenous emissions 
cap). That is, the same outcome would eventuate if each 
airline was allocated emissions rights for 88 million kg 
of CO2 and Airline A purchased emissions rights for 5 
million kgCO2 from Airline B.
4.2 Interactions Between a Benchmark CO2 
Intensity System and Other Abatement 
Measures
A CO2 benchmark system could operate concurrently 
with the CORSIA, as illustrated in Figure 3. Under the 
CORSIA, ICAO sets regulations for offset purchases to 
achieve carbon neutral growth and airlines purchase 
emission reduction credits from the offset market (solid 
lines). Adding a CO2 benchmark system requires ICAO 
to set route-group benchmark CO2 intensities and air-
lines to buy and sell permits from each other (dashed 
lines). Offsets and CO2 benchmark permits are not trad-
able, so the rules for the CORSIA are independent of 
those for the CO2 benchmark system. That is, introduc-
ing a CO2 benchmark system does not require modifying 
Table 2. A numerical example of a benchmark CO2 intensity system.
No CO2 benchmark CO2 benchmark – 88 kgCO2 / RTK
Airline A Airline B Industry Airline A Airline B Industry
RTK (Revenue Ton Kilometers) 
per year 1 million 1 million 2 million 1 million 1 million 2 million
CO2 emissions 
kg per year 95 million 85 million 180 million 93 million 83 million 176 million
CO2 intensity 
kgCO2 / RTK
95 85 90 93 83 88
Net permit purchases 
kg per year 5 million -5 million –
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the regulations for CORSIA. Due to increased in-sector 
abatement, the CO2 intensity benchmark system will 
reduce the number of offsets that the aviation industry 
needs to purchase to achieve carbon neutral growth.
A CO2 benchmark system could also operate simultane-
ously with the CO2 standard adopted by the ICAO Coun-
cil in early 2017 (ICAO, 2016b). From 2020, the standard 
sets minimum performance thresholds for new aircraft 
using a metric related to fuel efficiency as a function of 
aircraft shape and mass. A benchmark CO2 intensity 
system would provide additional incentives for manu-
factures to improve the efficiency of new aircraft—per-
haps beyond that mandated by the standard—and would 
allow airlines to execute other options to reduce emis-
sions (e.g., accelerating the introduction of new aircraft 
or changing the operation of existing aircraft). 
4.3 Fairness Concerns
A benchmark CO2 intensity system also provides the 
aviation industry with an optional lever to address ‘fair-
ness’ concerns—influenced by, for example, differences 
in route characteristics, common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities, or differences in existing fleets across air-
lines—in the assignment of emission abatement obliga-
tions. Under the system, ICAO could reduce the cost to 
an airline by assigning less stringent benchmark CO2 in-
tensities to route groups accounting for a relatively large 
share of operations for that airline.
Table 3 illustrates the use of a benchmark CO2 intensity 
system to address fairness issues. In the example, three 
airlines (C, D and E) each fly one million RTKs per year 
across up to three route groups. Suppose the benchmark 
CO2 intensity on route 1 is 80 kgCO2/RTK and those on 
routes 2 and 3 are, respectively, 90 kgCO2/RTK and 80 
kgCO2/RTK. As Airline E services routes assigned high-
er intensity benchmarks, it has to meet a less stringent 
fleet-wide CO2 benchmark intensity (95 kgCO2/RTK) 
than the other airlines (90 kgCO2/RTK). Assuming that 
operations for Airline C result in 85 kg/CO2 and those 
for Airlines D and E each generate 95 kg/CO2, Airline 
C will sell permits for five million tons of emissions to 
Airline D. Despite Airline E operating at the same CO2 
intensity as Airline D, it does not have to purchase per-
mits (due to the assignment of benchmark intensities). 
Nevertheless, as it could sell permits by operating below 
its benchmark intensity, Airline E faces a marginal in-
centive to reduce emissions equal to the price of permits. 
As rules for the CORSIA are independent of those for 
a benchmark CO2 intensity system, fairness concerns 
could also be addressed (entirely) by the assignment of 
CORSIA offsetting obligations if desired by ICAO.
5. Conclusions
Avoiding undesirable climate impacts requires limiting 
future global emissions of GHGs. As emission abatement 
options for airlines are relatively expensive, the aviation 
industry has an incentive to preserve the Earth’s capacity 
to absorb GHG emissions for its own use. The aviation 
industry can achieve this objective by implementing reg-
ulations that result in an efficient level of in-sector emis-
sions abatement that can also serve as a blueprint for mit-
igation of GHGs in other sectors. The CORSIA is a step 
in the right direction but it does not achieve these goals 
because the current price of offsets is much lower than 
the SCC and, for an individual airline, reducing emis-
sions by one ton reduces that airline’s offset obligation by 
less than one ton (in most circumstances). 
This paper proposed a benchmark CO2 intensity system 
with tradable permits that will price marginal emissions 
at the SCC, can operate alongside the CORSIA and the 
Figure 3. the CORsIA and a benchmark CO2 intensity system with tradable permits.
Note: CO2 intensity permits and offset credits are not tradable.
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industry’s CO2 standard, and could provide several ben-
efits for the aviation industry (and other industries that 
adopt similar measures). A key potential benefit of a CO2 
benchmark system is that it incents all in-sector emis-
sions abatement options that cost less than the SCC while 
only applying the SCC to a small fraction of emissions. 
Consequently, an industry-initiated CO2 benchmark 
system (that results in a socially desirable level of in-sec-
tor abatement) may prevent future government regula-
tions that impose higher costs on the industry. In short, 
a benchmark CO2 intensity system is an attractive, or at 
least a palatable, measure for industries to abate a social-
ly desirable level of in-sector emissions. The benchmark 
CO2 intensity system outlined in this paper also provides 
another (optional) channel for ICAO to address fair-
ness concerns in the assignment of emissions abatement 
obligations.
The negotiating platform built for the CORSIA provides 
an opportunity to introduce a benchmark CO2 intensity 
system for international aviation. In particular, the trien-
nial review of the scheme by ICAO provides scope for the 
phase-in of a CO2 benchmark system. As a CO2 bench-
mark system would result in a socially efficient level of 
aviation emissions abetment, this system could eventual-
ly replace the CORSIA. 
There is also scope to introduce a benchmark CO2 inten-
sity system for international shipping as, like the aviation 
industry, it has the necessary governance infrastructure 
to initiate a global sectoral measure. The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has declared itself as the 
‘appropriate international body to… address GHG emis-
sions from ships engaged in international trade’ (IMO, 
2016). However, this organization has been criticized for 
its slow progress on climate issues (Darby, 2016) and sev-
eral commentators have called for the implementation of 
a market-based measure (e.g., Rahim et al., 2016). As the 
global carbon budget shrinks and inexpensive abatement 
options are left on the table each year, there is an urgent 
need for a socially efficient carbon price on emissions 
from aviation, shipping, and other industries.
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Table 3. using a benchmark CO2 intensity system to address fairness concerns.
Airline C Airline D Airline E
Airline operations 
RTKs per year
Route 1  –  80 kgCO2 / RTK – 1⁄ 3 million –
Route 2  –  90 kgCO2 / RTK 1 million 1⁄ 3 million 1⁄ 2 million
Route 3 – 100 kgCO2 / RTK – 1⁄ 3 million 1⁄ 2 million
Fleet-wide benchmark and actual CO2 intensities 
kgCO2 / RTK
Average benchmark CO2 intensity 90 90 95
Actual CO2 intensity 85 95 95
Permitted and actual CO2 emissions and net permit purchases 
kgCO2 per year
Emissions permitted 90 million 90 million 95 million
Actual emissions 85 million 95 million 95 million
Net permits purchased -5 million 5 million 0
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